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REGULATORS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR SMALL
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The financial meltdown in September 2008 shocked the average citizen
into recognizing what the financial sector had failed to publicly
acknowledge since at least the collapse of The Bear Steams Companies,
Inc. the previous March-4hat sinkholes in the economic landscape were
prevalent and deep.' From September through the remainder of the Fall of
2008, media reports on a weekly basis confirmed that the world had indeed
changed, as Lehman Brothers went bankrupt,2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were discredited,3 AIG faced insolvency4 and the stability of the United
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The Bear Steams Companies, Inc. was a global investment banking firm that
began business in 1923 and employed more than 15,000 employees. Fortune
magazine recognized the firm as one of "America's Most Admired Companies" in
2007. The company, whose stock had traded above $133.00 on the New York
Stock Exchange within the previous twelve months, was sold to JP Morgan Chase
for $10.00 a share on May 30, 2008, and the Federal Reserve took responsibility
for $29 billion of "toxic" assets in Bear Steams' portfolio. See generally Roddy
Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, CNNMONEY (Mar. 31, 2008, 1:59 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines/fortune/boyd bear.fortune/.2 Founded in 1850, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection on September 15, 2008, the largest bankruptcy in United States history.
See generally Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, WALL
ST. J., (Sept. 15, 2008, 10:11 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-
folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss. Twenty-two additional affiliates
filed petitions in the Bankruptcy Court. See, e.g., In re Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The firm's North American investment-banking and trading divisions, as well as its
New York headquarters building, were purchased by Barclays, and its Asia-Pacific
business and European and Middle East investment banking and equities
businesses by Nomura Holdings. By October 13, 2008, the fourth largest
investment bank in the United States was defunct.3 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Statement by Fed. Res.
Bd. Chairman Ben S. Bemanke (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080907a.htm.
Government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage
Association, founded in 1938) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, founded in 1970) required federal bailouts to survive. Kate Pickert, A
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States banking system was called into question. A global economic crisis
ensued, and three years later more than a few of the coals are still glowing.
An anticipated recovery in the housing sector evaporated in 2011,
mortgage foreclosures remain stalled and a double-dip recession is seen by
some as still possible. Sustained economic growth depends on new jobs,
and job growth remains stagnant. On August 5, 2011, for the first time in
history, the United States lost its Triple-A credit rating, when Standard &
Poor's announced it was downgrading the United States debt rating to
AA+.5 This action pushed the Dow Jones Industrial Average the next
Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, TIME (July 14, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1822766,00.html. Beginning in
July 2008, media reports that the U.S. government was considering a plan to take
over these entities, which owned or guaranteed as much as half of all residential
loans, the values of which had severely declined. See generally Charles Duhigg,
Loan-Agency Woes Swellfrom a Trickle to a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/1 I/business/i1 ripple.html?ex= 1373515200&en=
8ad220403fcfdf6e&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink. The
combined debt owned or guaranteed by the two companies was reportedly more
than $5 trillion. Kyle Baxter, A Study of the Financial Crisis, TIGHT WIND (Dec. 6,
2010), http://tightwind.net/2010/12/a-study-of-the-financial-crisis/. On
September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were being placed into
conservatorship of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN
CONSERVATORSHIP (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/i 10097.pdf. The FHFA director dismissed the chief
executive officer and directors of the companies and caused the issuance of new
securities amounting to 79.9% of each corporation to the Treasury. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE COST OF GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL
INTERVENTIONS, PAST AND PRESENT (Sept. 23, 2008), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/1 10285.pdf As of mid-2011, the cost
of the bailout of Freddie Mac was $51.9 billion and the cost of the Fannie Mae
bailout was $89 billion. Nick Timiraos, Freddie Says Loss Narrows, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2011, at C2.4 American International Group, Inc. (AIG), an insurance corporation with
worldwide businesses listed on the New York Stock Exchange, was granted an
$85 billion credit facility to enable the company to meet increased collateral
obligations when it suffered a liquidity crisis as a result of the downgrade of its
credit ratings below "AA" levels in September 2008. In the transaction, the
company granted the Federal Reserve a stock warrant for 79.9% of its equity. See
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm. The
Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury increased the potential financial support to
more than $182.5 billion by May 2009. Through a $60 billion credit line and
$52.5 billion to buy mortgage-based assets owned or guaranteed by AIG,
increasing the total amount available to as much as $182.5 billion. AIG
subsequently sold a number of its subsidiaries and other assets to pay down loans
received, and continues to seek buyers of its assets. Press Release, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., U.S. Treasury and Fed. Res. Bd. Announce
Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan (Mar. 2, 2009), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20090302a.htm.
5 Standard & Poor's stated as part of the rationale that it was "pessimistic about the
capacity of Congress and the administration to leverage their agreement this week
into a broader [deficit cutting] plan that stabilizes the government's debt dynamics
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trading day to its steepest one-day decline since December 2008 and its
lowest close, at 634.76 (a 5.5% decline), since October 2010. Bank stocks
experienced their largest one-day drop since April 2009, with Bank of
America Corp. and Citigroup, Inc. suffering declines of 20% and 16%,
respectively.
Notwithstanding concern that the economic recovery may be faltering,
in many respects the U.S. economy has largely regained traction, at least
from an economist's viewpoint. In the author's view, the essential structure
of the capital markets and the financial institutions sector remain intact, and
significant rebuilding has taken place.6 The reasons for and the response to
the financial meltdown are as many and various as the books and blogs and
broadcasts which followed. From the beginning, and with some
justification, regulatory laxness was targeted as a substantial contributing
factor to the excesses and abuses of the financial sector and its implosion.
Not surprisingly, a pendulum swing towards tighter regulation resulted,
which has had a disproportionate, negative impact on smaller businesses.
The speed and scope of new legislation and increased regulation following
September 2008 made careful and deliberate study difficult, with the
inevitable result that implementation of targeted and measured remedies
have been less important than swift and comprehensive action
demonstrating government's willingness to "fix" the situation. Victory has
been declared and, from a high altitude perspective, legitimately so. As a
military M*A*S*H unit's work must be applauded for the lives it saves, the
swift action of White House and Federal Reserve policymakers and efforts
of lawmakers on Capitol Hill have indeed saved the patient. However, the
costs have been substantial, and the fallout--particularly for small
business-has been painful and is continuing. Regulatory hostility and new
any time soon." Nikola Swann, Research Update: United States ofAmerica Long-
Term Rating Lowered to 'AA+ ' on Political Risk and Rising Debt Burden; Outlook
Negative, STANDARD & POOR'S (Aug. 5, 2011), available at www.ft.com/
cms/af2c4fac-bfc2- 1 e0-90d5-00144feabdc0.pdf.6 While the recession officially ended in June 2009, and unemployment peaked in
October 2009, one leading investment firm still characterized its "long held view
that this will be a sluggish and distorted business cycle." RBC Global Mgmt.(U.S.),
Inc., Quarterly Review and Outlook (Mar. 31, 2011), available at
http://us.rbcgam.com/resources/docs/pdf/quarterly-
newsletters/QrtlyReviewl QI I .pdf. In the same report, RBC noted that equities had
rebounded with most global stock markets fully recovered from the September
2008 market collapse. Id. Volatility and a gloomy economic outlook continued,
however, with succeeding rounds of bad news. Id. In August 2011, the United
States lost its Triple-A credit rating, and in September and October 2011, the
European debt crisis dominated the media. Id. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke on October 4, 2011, warned the Congressional Joint Economic
Committee that the economic recovery "is close to faltering." Jon Hilsenrath &
Luca Di Leo, Bernanke Issues Warning, Urges Action on Economy, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204524604
576610712269716064.html.
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policies emanating from Washington and state capitals are crimping the
ability of small businesses to achieve financing and raise capital. Access to
loans and local capital sources, advisors and intermediaries is being overly
restricted by federally-directed policies.7
I. SETTING THE SCENE-BIGGER ISN'T ALWAYS BETTER
As with every human or natural disaster of great magnitude or effect,
there are numerous culprits. In the aftermath of the financial meltdown it is
easy to lay blame on the regulators, and much of it is justified. Congress
used a meat cleaver in 2010 with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act8 as it did in 2002 with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,9 and is certainly culpable. In many cases, regulatory
gaps rather than excessive regulation were revealed to be instrumental in
the financial crisis. Greed and excess on Wall Street and among ordinary
Americans grasping for their piece of the pie also contributed to an
untenable and inevitably unsustainable period of prosperity--until the
bubble burst. The inability and unwillingness of those who structured
financial products and extended credit and those who invested and
borrowed to acknowledge or evaluate risk is, with hindsight, astounding.
Deals that looked too good to be true, as is always the case, were revealed
to be held together only by theories and wishful thinking.
The United States financial sector and the capital and credit markets are
complex and interconnected with those of the global economy. U.S.
regulators do not implement or coordinate their policies or enforcement in
uniform or even parallel fashion. In a democratic, capitalist system, that is
difficult and may well be impossible to achieve. In a competitive world
economy, lowest common denominator regulation would likely be
ineffective, if not economically disastrous. The financial problems that
overwhelmed the economy in late 2008 are not subject to easy analysis, and
examination of only a few related segments of the economy cannot explain
the resulting chaos. Nevertheless, a review of one significant aspect of our
recent experience, with the goal of understanding at least a part of the
reason why small businesses have been stifled in their historical role of
leading economic development, is instructive. Specifically, this article
explores why, in the aftermath of the financial meltdown, community banks
have been unable to provide financing to help small companies grow and
7 Even prior to the financial meltdown in 2008, the primary non-bank regulator, the
SEC, was criticized for not adequately assisting small business capital formation.
Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC's Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1
t2007).
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2010).
9 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 15 U.S.C §§ 7201-7206, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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create jobs as they historically have and why, perhaps, this recovery has
been more protracted than prior recoveries.
Despite loose monetary policy, credit has only increased at a modest
pace. In fact, since the financial crisis while bank profits have increased
136%, lending through June 30, 2011, had fallen in ten of the past twelve
quarters and declined during the period by 9%.'o Lending to small
businesses by U.S. banks declined during 2009-2010, according to the
United States Small Business Administration (SBA)." In a release issued
on February 10, 2011, the agency reported that small business lending
dropped by 6.2%. While this was less than the 8.9% drop in large business
lending, the study effectively confirmed the experience of smaller
businesses, notwithstanding the assertions by bank regulators and larger
banks that they were. actively lending during this period.' 2 Ironically, and
notwithstanding the new small business loan programs touted by President
Obama, the President's proposed SBA budget for 2012 of $985 million
represents a 45% decrease from the 2010 budgeted level.
1 3
The analysis is not simple, and the picture is a fragmented mosaic of
contradictory and conflicting regulatory policies and uneven playing fields.
Development of a unified, rational, long-term approach to small business
financing is politically unrealistic, and the idea of a simple, common-sense
solution is naive. Nevertheless, by isolating a number of high-level issues
and discussing their effect on small business capital formation, an
appreciation for what needs to be addressed becomes obvious.
1o Stephen Gandel, After Three Years and Trillions of Dollars, Our Banks Still
Don't Work, TIME, Sept. 26, 2011, at 41. Non-farming, nonresidential small
business loans of between $100,000-$200,000 declined to 2003 levels of less than
$60 billion. Robin Sidel, Fed Up: A Texas Bank Is Calling It Quits, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 10, 2011, at C1 (citing FDIC data).
11 Small Firm Lending, 2009-2010: Harbingers of Growth, U.S. SMALL Bus.
ADMIN. (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.sba.gov/content/small-firm-lending-2009-
201 0-harbingers-growth.
12 In May 2010, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Alan B. Krueger
testified that small business employee layoffs were due, at least in part, to the lack
of access to credit. Initiatives to Promote Small Business Lending, Jobs and
Economic Growth: Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111 th Cong. 2
(2010) (statement of James D. MacPhee, Chairman, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am.),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/I 11/
5_1710 macphee.pdf. He noted that small businesses are more dependent on bank
credit than medium and large businesses that have access to credit through the
corporate bond market. Id.
13 FY2012 Congressional Budget Justification and FY2010 Annual Performance
Report, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (2011), available at http://www.sba.gov/
sites/default/files/F[NAL%20FY%202012%20CBJ%20FY%202010%20APR O.pd
f. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the Small Business Lending Fund and
related programs.
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By design, the examination of these issues is broad-brush, and its
purpose is to suggest relationships between regulatory trends and effects
that necessarily have resulted from a non-holistic approach to capital
formation and smaller entities generally. The bottom line is that, despite the
overwhelming influence of small businesses on innovation and job creation,
the regulatory focus has been, and continues to be, on larger companies and
larger financial institutions. Rather than encouraging a spectrum of market
participants, the emphasis on "systemically significant" and "too big to fail"
is squelching new business development and growth. By shining the light
on some of the factors that have led to this unhealthy predicament, a more
flexible and rational regulatory net may be woven to stimulate a more
robust and diverse economy.14
Thomas Hoenig, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City for more than eighteen years until his
retirement in October 2011, believes that by keeping interest rates near
zero, the Federal Reserve is "asking savers to continue to subsidize
borrowers. 15 In a Time magazine article in February 2011, Hoenig
chastised his fellow regulators and complained that government policy
continued to be favorable towards the Wall Street rather than the Main
Street financial institutions. Hoenig's view is that, instead of breaking up
the mega-banks whose speculation led to the economic meltdown, the
government has allowed them to grow larger. 16 When questioned as to what
the penalty for failure is, Mr. Hoenig replied, "We don't have a market
economy now.'
17
Steve Stanek, a research fellow at the Heartland Institute in Chicago,
asserted in a January 2011 article that the federal regulatory tilt towards
large financial institutions was unfair and dangerous.' 8 He contrasted two
recent Wall Street Journal articles, one noting that nearly one hundred
small U.S. banks that received federal bailout funds showed signs they were
in jeopardy of failing, 19 the other reporting that, as demand for loans had
14 From a 30,000 feet perspective, in addition to federal bank regulatory hostility to
smaller institutions, the author believes that state activism threatens a unified
system of reasonable regulation, and obsolete securities regulations that are
unnecessary for the protection of investors are sapping small businesses of their
strength to innovate and create new jobs.
15 David Von Drehle, The Fed's Dissenter: Saying No to Easy Money, TIME,
Feb. 14, 201 1, at 42.
16 See generally id.
7 Von Drehle, supra note 15, at 45.
18 Steve Stanek, Woes of Protecting Businesses 'Too Big to Fail', TBO.COM
(Jan. 30, 2011), http://www2.tbo.com/news/opinion/201 1/jan/30/VWOPINO2-
stanek-woes-of-protecting-businesses-too--ar- 11476/.
'9 Michael Rapoport, Bailed-Out Banks Slip Toward Failure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27,
2010, at C1.
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begun to rise, some large, healthier banks were seeking to grab customers
from weaker rivals.2z
Mr. Stanek recognized these larger banks as the same ones deemed "too
big to fail"--and those most responsible for the poor underwriting,
securitizations and unwise investments that resulted in disaster. Instead of
being broken up and their assets sold to other banks, including smaller ones,
the large banks received federal bailout funds:
How ironic that many of the struggling smaller banks
would probably be stronger today if only they had been
able to take over the assets of the big banks that would
have failed without government interference. Instead,
small banks continue to fail, at least in part, because the
government interference that was meant to "save" the
financial system has impaired their ability to compete
with the firms that were most responsible for nearly
wrecking the system in the first place. And how ironic
that as the big banks become even bigger, and the
financial system puts more of its eggs into one "too-big-
to-fail" basket, the danger to the system becomes even
greater.2z
Mr. Stanek's words were prescient. By September 2011, the stock price of-
the parent company for the nation's largest bank, Bank of America,
notwithstanding a $5 billion investment by Warren Buffett, declined by
50%.2
A joint letter sent to members of the U.S. Senate, the Associated
Builders and Contractors, Inc. and the Independent Community Bankers of
America in January 2011 asserted that "overly burdensome federal
regulations negatively impact the economy," and urged that a more
balanced regulatory environment be encouraged to "allow community
banks to continue to serve 'the needs of their local customers-small
businesses. '23 The letter emphasized the importance of community banks to
20 Ruth Simon, Banks Open Loan Spigot, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2010, at Al.
2 Stanek, supra note 18.
22 While it is almost universally acknowledged that job growth is necessary for a
sustained economic recovery, Bank of America laid off approximately 6000
employees in 2011 and announced on September 12, 2011, that it intends to
eliminate another 30,000 jobs, or approximately 10% of its staff, by 2014. Hugh
Son, Dawn Kopecki & Max Abelson, Bank ofAmerica to Slash 30,000 Jobs in
Cost-Cutting Plan, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:07 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-12/bofa-to-slash-30-000-jobs-in-first-
phase-of-cost-cutting-program.html.
3 Letter from M. Kirk Pickerel, President and CEO, Associated Builders and
Contractors and Camden R. Fine, President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of
Am., to Senate (Jan. 20, 2011) (on file with author).
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small business, stating that these institutions support 31% of all small
business loans that are less than $1 million.
Losses by banks and bank failures have been hallmarks of the
2008-2010 recession. In 2010, 157 banks.failed, 50 of them in just two
states, Florida (29) and Georgia (2 1).24 Nationally, there have been 386
bank failures since the beginning of 2008, 326 of which had total assets of
less than $1 billion.25 While the current pace of failures has slowed, there
had already been 64 bank failures in 2011 (through August 16, 201 1).26 The
number of banks on the "problem list" of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) rose to 888 as of March 31, 2011, representing
approximately 12% of all FDIC-insured institutions-the highest number in
nearly twenty years.27 In Florida, as of December 31, 2010, there were only
246 insured institutions, down nearly 20% from the 307 banks and thrifts in
the state at the end of 2008. These financial institutions collectively had at
the end of 2010 approximately 27,000 employees, nearly 13% less than
they did at the end of 2008.
II. SMALL BUSINESS As THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ENGINE
'Small businesses make up the backbone of the U.S. economy. Each
year, the SEC, by law, hosts 'the SEC Government-Business Forum on
Small Business Capital Formation. At the 28th Annual Forum, held in
Washington, D.C. on November 19, 2009, SEC Chairman Mary L.
Schapiro explained the SEC's three-pronged mission: to protect investors,
to maintain fair and orderly markets and efficient markets, and to facilitate
capital formation. She began her remarks as follows:
Today we are focusing primarily on the third, facilitating
capital formation. But, I think it's important that we don't
think of these three prongs as distinct or separate goals.
They are in fact intertwined and interdependent. We cannot
have fair and efficient markets without the ability of
companies to effectively raise capital, and companies
cannot raise capital unless investors believe that the
markets are fair and orderly. Without access to capital,
24 Bank Failures in Brief FDIC, http://www.fdic.govbank/historical/bank/2010/
(last updated June 22, 2011). Information regarding the number of insured financial
institutions, bank failures and related information is taken from the website of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, www.fdic.gov.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Potential Mixed Messages. Is Guidance from Washington Being Implemented by
Federal Bank Examiners?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. of Fin. Inst. and
Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. 54 (2011) (statement of Christopher J. Spoth,
Senior Deputy Dir. Div. of Risk Mgmt. Supervision, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/081611 fdic.pdf
(hereinafter Potential Mixed Messages).
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business slows. Without investor confidence, capital
disappears. That is something the business community
knows all too well, and it is something that I, as the
daughter of a small business operator who recently retired
at the age of 88, understand as well. Today's forum
specifically addresses small business capital formation.
This is particularly appropriate, because as President
Obama recently said, small businesses fuel our prosperity
and have to be at the forefront of any recovery.28
SEC Commissioner Troy A. Paredes added his voice of support for
small businesses:
Although attention often seems to focus on larger
enterprises, we need to appreciate that small and emerging
businesses offer unique opportunities for investors,
entrepreneurs, employees, and consumers. Smaller
companies, however, also face distinct challenges and
hurdles .... A small firm should not necessarily be subject
to the same regulatory demands that a Fortune 500
company is required to shoulder. Among other things, one
needs to consider the disproportionate burden that a given
regulatory requirement can impose on a small business and
the costs we all bear if, as a result, businesses struggle to
get off the ground or expand. When a small business can't
secure funding at a reasonable cost, for example, the
economy is deprived of the firm's full participation in the
marketplace.29
At the following year's Forum, on November 18, 2010, Chairman
Schapiro reiterated these points, noting that reliable data suggested small
businesses had created 60% to 80% of net new American jobs over the last
ten years:
And it's not just the number of jobs created that are
important; it's the kind of jobs. At a time when improving
our global trade position is a top priority, small businesses
produced almost a third of America's exports. And, at a
time when expanding those exports-while increasing
domestic market share-often means producing the
28 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Remarks at the 28th
Annual SEC Gov't-Bus. Forum on Small Bus. Capital Formation (Nov. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor28.pdf
29 Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Remarks at the
28th Annual SEC Gov't-Bus. Forum on Small Bus. Capital Formation (Nov. 19,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch 1I1909tap.htm.
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technology's cutting edge, small business employees earn
patents at 13 times the rate of those in larger firms.30
The critical role of small business as a driver of the U.S. economy and a
vital part of the recovery is undisputed. Nevertheless, while acknowledging
the distinct challenges and hurdles that small businesses face, the
disproportionate impact of regulatory compliance often creates barriers to
entry or expansion. How this works in practice sets the stage for a better
understanding of how regulation that may be necessary and desirable on a
policy basis can, nonetheless, stifle small business growth due to the
difficulties of smaller entities to meet the regulatory burden.
In a submission to the 29th Annual SEC Government-Business Forum
on Small Business Capital Formation in November 2010, the American
Bankers Association commented that increasing the shareholder thresholds
for registration and de-registration under Section 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act), smaller publicly-held
community banks and savings associations would save approximately
$250,000 per bank. The letter continued with the following statement:
In the banking industry, it is understood that every one
dollar saved can support $7-$10 of new lending. As a
consequence, we believe that raising the shareholder
threshold can have an immediate and positive impact on
the amount of capital that could be deployed by community
banks to increase lending to small businesses in their
communities.3'
The effect of strict regulation on the unavailability of credit has resulted
in a lack of optimism for many. small business owners. The Wall Street
Journal reported that an index of small business confidence declined in July
2011 to its lowest level since September 2010 and that small firms
consistently expressed more pessimism than larger ones, purportedly
because they have less access to credit.32
30 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 29th
Annual SEC Gov't-Bus. Forum on Small Bus. Capital Formation (Nov. 18, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/infor/smallbus/gbfor29.pdf.31 Memorandum from Carolyn Walsh, Vice President & Senior Counsel, Ctr. for
Sec., Trust &Invs., Am. Bankers Ass'n to the 29th Annual SEC Gov.-Bus. Forum
on Small Bus. Capital Formation (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/info/
smallbus/201Ogbforum/201Ogbforum-aba.pdf.
32 Kathleen Madigan, Small Business Confidence Dips to Lowest Level Since July
2010, WALL ST. J. REAL TIME ECON. BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011, 8:16 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/09/13/small-business-confidence-dips-to-
lowest-level-since-july-2010/ (citing Small Business Optimism Index, NAT'L. FED.
OF INDEP. Bus. (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.nfib.com/press-media/press-media-
item?cmsid=57841).
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These and other participants in the SEC Forum from the banking,
investor and legal communities pointed out other regulations that unduly
burden smaller companies and inhibit capital formation and offered
suggestions for addressing their concerns.33  Many of these
recommendations have been repeatedly made and yet have not been given
serious attention by the regulators. While some of the recommendations
could not withstand the scrutiny of the federal rulemaking process, many
promising proposals do not even have the possibility of public exposure. In
many cases, it is because the SEC and the bank regulatory agencies are
preoccupied-and obsessed-with the larger institutions. Therefore, many
potentially beneficial proposals will remain unexplored or on the back
burner.
III. CoMMuNiTY BANKS UNDER SIEGE
A. The Background
The United States has the most robust and diverse banking sector in the
world. In contrast to many countries, where banking institutions are closely
affiliated with governments or royal families, or other developed nations in
which only a few megabanks exist, the United States has an unrivaled depth
and breadth of financial depository institutions. The American Bankers
Association, representing banks of all sizes and types of charters, is the
dominant voice for the nation's $13 trillion banking industry and its two
million employees. Within this large and diverse banking sector are a great
number of "community banks." The Independent Community Bankers of
America has nearly 5000 members of all sizes and charter types. The
association represents more than 20,000 locations, employing nearly
33 At the same Forum, a submission from the Angel Capital Association,
representing more than 6500 accredited angel investors in its 150 member angel
organizations in 44 states, offered recommendations relating to angel investing,
including changes to the accredited investor standards and the general solicitation
prohibition. Written Statement of Marianne Hudson, Angel Capital Ass'n, for the
29th Annual SEC Gov.-Bus. Forum on Small Bus. Capital Formation (Nov. 18,
2010), available at www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor29.pdf. The submission noted
that an analysis by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation in 2009 and 2010 found that "businesses that were less than five years
old created all of the net new jobs in our country over the last 25 years." Id. The
organization estimates that angel investors may be responsible for up to 90% of the
outside equity raised by 30,000 to 50,000 start-up companies after the capital
resources of their founders are exhausted. Id. The letter stated that approximately
250,000 angels invest $20 to $30 billion per year in promising early-stage
companies, with investments from $10,000 to $200,000 per company. Id. Based
upon a membership survey, the organization noted a trend for individual angels tojoin together in formal angel groups to pool their expertise and capital to make total
investments of $100,000 to as much as $2 million in a range of companies, a large
portion of which are in technology, clean tech and life science fields. Id.
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300,000 employees and holding $1 trillion in assets, $800 billion in
deposits and $700 billion in loans to consumers, small business and the
agricultural community.
These "Main Street" community banks have a different business model
from large and internationally active institutions. Organized by local
businesspersons, community banks serve local businesses, often in a single
county and, generally, within a single state or in contiguous states. The
boards of directors of these institutions are comprised of local community
leaders and businesspersons, and the investors are primarily from this same
community. Because these institutions historically were primarily chartered
by the states and organized with small amounts of capital, quite often less
than $15 million, their lending limits were low and, therefore, loan facilities
were generally small. Real estate loans form the backbone of loan portfolios
of these institutions, particularly in high-growth and Sunbelt states.
Relationships between community banks and their regulators historically
were in a very real sense friendly. The regulators were focused on the safety
and soundness of deposits, and bank inspections were intended to ensure
banks conformed to their regulatory responsibilities. The attitude of the
regulators, importantly, was that they were there to assist the banks for
which they were responsible. Except where there were indications of fraud,
gross mismanagement or utter lack of attention by the board of directors,
regulators were flexible and patient and, in a true sense, helpful in assisting
community banks to operate in a safe and sound fashion. Examinations,
while focused on compliance, were also intended to instruct and improve
bank practices and procedures.
B. The 2008 Financial Meltdown
"Main Street" community banks generally have a different business
plan than large financial institutions. Accordingly, they should, and in many
cases they do, have a different banking regime. The Dodd-Frank Act,
enacted into law on July 21, 2010, in many important respects differentiates
between community banks and large banks, for example with respect to the
FDIC assessment base, stricter oversight of too-big-to-fail institutions and
protection for trust preferred securities. Nevertheless, many aspects of
regulation do not so differentiate, and most of the time the smaller
institutions bear the brunt of increased regulation or lack of flexibility.
Particularly following the financial meltdown, community banks have
found themselves in a no-win situation, with too many problem assets,
insufficient capital and regulators that are no longer patient, flexible or
helpful.
Some specific federal policies led to disastrous results for smaller
banks. For example, smaller banks were encouraged by their regulators,
through the favorable capital treatment they received, to invest in preferred
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securities issued by two federally-chartered entities, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac). 34  When these government-sponsored
organizations faltered, the federal government took them over and their
perpetual preferred securities became worthless, resulting in a tremendous
financial blow to the small banks that held them. Almost overnight,*
millions of dollars of capital that had been presumed to be safe and secure
became worthless and the banks that had relied on these investments, often
at the recommendation of their bank examiners, were undercapitalized.35
As the financial crisis deepened, regulatory authority shifted from the
regional offices of the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and
the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to their Washington
headquarters. The influence of the regional regulators diminished, and
decision-making shifted to remote, policy-focused agency officials in
Washington, D.C. Instead of bankers dealing with regional officers they
knew-and who knew the institution-and who could make decisions,
bankers were told that matters were being "coordinated" with headquarter's
officials. Decisions were made on the basis of broadly-focused remedial
policy, often by new personnel or those who had recently assumed new
responsibilities as a result of agency reorganizations. As criticism of the
major banking institutions mounted in Congress, decisions were postponed,
the incentive for an individual agency official to take responsibility in a
shifting environment diminished, and walls of distrust' between banks and
regulators were created. Ultimately, it became clear that the disconnect
between public policy statements emanating from agency heads in
Washington and the bank examiners had widened to the point where it.
could not be resolved.36 In theory, the regulators were supporting small
34 In the risk-weighted capital analysis imposed by bank regulators, see Cohn &
Yadley, supra note 7, Fannie Mae securities, as well as those of other lower risk
government sponsored securities, were risk-weighted at 20%. Id. Mortgage loans(current, properly underwritten and fully secured by first liens on one-to-four
family residential properties) are risk-weighted at 50%. Id. Commercial loans,
considered much riskier assets, have a 100% risk weighting. Id.35 "This was an unprecedented breach of faith." Initiatives to Promote Small
Business Lending, Jobs and Economic Growth, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 11 th
Cong. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Incentives] (statement of James D. MacPhee, on behalf
of the Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am.).36 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-i 1-489, BANKING REGULATION:
ENHANCED GUIDANCE ON COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE RISKS NEEDED 30 (2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO- 11-489. Many bankers felt that the
management component of the CAMELS rating was being more critically assessed,
blaming management for the deterioration in their bank's portfolios, instead of
recognizing the effects of the broader economic downturn, which was out of
management's control. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Off. of the Comptroller of the
Currency & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Guidance on Concentrations
in Commercial Real Estate Lending, Sound Risk Management Practices (Dec. 12,
2006), available at http:/ www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2006/fil06104.html.
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business. In a Financial Institution Letter issued in February 2010 and
captioned "Meeting the Credit Needs of Creditworthy Small Business
Borrowers," the agency stated, "Financial institutions that engage in
prudent small business lending after performing a comprehensive review of
a borrower's financial decision will not be subject to criticism. '37 While
under this policy examiners were not supposed to adversely classify loans
solely due to a decline in the collateral value below the loan balance,
provided the borrower had the willingness and ability to repay the loan
according to reasonable terms, this was not the case in practice. Although
senior bank regulators proclaimed that their agencies supported new
lending activity, their examiners were tightening the regulatory screws and
making it increasingly difficult for community banks to do business and
earn profits.38 As the financial condition of banks worsened, the
opportunities to grow out of their problems or raise capital diminished, and
a downward spiral began that often ended in bank failure.
Between January 1, 2008, and August 16, 2011, 386 banks had been
closed by regulatory authorities, with 157 bank failures in 2010 alone and
sixty-four through the first seven and one-half months of 2011. There were
888 institutions on the FDIC's "watch list" of troubled banks as of
August 16, 2011. The condition of the Deposit Insurance Fund has
improved over the past several quarters and, at June 30, 2011, achieved its
first positive quarter-end balance ($4.9 billion) since June 30, 2009. 39
C. Bank Regulatory OversightFans the Flames
The Dodd-Frank Act and regulatory activism undoubtedly has led to
improvements and corrected some of the laxness that evolved during the
expanding economy leading up to late 2008. But some of the sharpest
focus, while helpful in an overall sense, has acted primarily to assuage
government consciences and mask areas where more profound and difficult
37 FDIC, Meeting the Credit Needs of Creditworthy Small Business Borrowers
(Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/20 10/
fill0005.html.
38 Support for the assertion by many community bankers that bank examiners are
acting too rigidly was found in a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report to the Committee on Financial Services. U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36 (Concluding that in many cases examiners
did not properly calculate or support commercial real estate (CRE) concentrations
and CRE concentration thresholds were being interpreted as limits, without
reviewing the bank's risk management practices and examining how the federal
banking regulators responded to CRE trends prior to, and after, the economic
meltdown, how the CRE Guidance has been interpreted by agency officials, and
whether the CRE Guidance is being consistently applied to banks).
39 As the larger banks recovered from the crisis and new assessments were levied
by the FDIC, by mid-2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund had been
replenished to its pre-September 2008 level. Quarterly Banking Profile: First
Quarter 2011, 5 FDIC Q. 1, at 14 (2011).
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issues remain. One example is executive compensation, undeniably an
important target, but the aim is off-center. On February 7, 2011, the Board
of Directors of the FDIC approved a joint proposed rulemaking to
implement Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act, prohibiting incentive-based
compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate risk taking by
covered financial institutions and are deemed to be excessive, or that may
lead to material losses.40 FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair said, "This proposed
rule will help address a key safety and soundness issue which contributed to
the recent financial crisis--that poorly designed compensation structures
can misalign incentives and induce excessive risk-taking within financial
organizations. ' 41
While the goal is laudatory, it does not follow that the regulatory
response will have a major positive impact. Substituting the judgment of the
FDIC and the other regulators as to what is excessive risk, especially with
respect to smaller commercial banking institutions, for that of business
people is of questionable value and counterproductive. The experience of
many community banks undergoing regulatory scrutiny during the past
three years suggests that the regulators today do not accept any risk.42 The
same regulators that examined banking institutions prior to 2007 and did
not express disagreement with those banks' assessment of risk, now
criticize them for taking excessive risk.43 The determination of what
compensation is excessive is similarly quixotic. Regulations under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, first presented to Congress on
September 19, 2008, by then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson,
set the bar for non-incentive based annual compensation at $500,000,
40 Incentive Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 72 (proposed Apr.
14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 372).
41 Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves for Public Comment Interagency
Rule to Implement the Incentive-Based Compensation Requirement Under Dodd-
Frank Reform Act (Feb. 7, 2011).
42 Examiners are focusing on the value of collateral irrespective of
the income or cash flow of the borrowers; placing loans on non-
accrual even though the borrower is current on payments;
discounting entirely the value of guarantors; criticizing long-
standing practices and processes that have never been questioned
before; and substituting their judgment for that of the appraiser.
Incentives, supra note 35, at 5.
43 OTS failed to take steps that could have prevented the failure in November 2009
of Century Bank FSB of Sarasota, Florida, according to the U.S. Treasury's Office
of Inspector General. The Inspector General found that the OTS did not act quickly
enough to intervene when the thrift's conditions were declining. The failure of
Century Bank reportedly cost the FDIC $266.5 million as of March 11, 2011.
Margie Manning, Treasury Review: OTS Fell Short in Preventing Century Bank
Failure, TAMPA BAY Bus. J. (July 18, 2011, 12:23 PM),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/tampabay/news/2011/07/18/treasury-review-ots-fell-
short-in.html.
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admittedly a living wage and generous for most Americans, but hardly
"excessive" in comparison to professional athletes, Hollywood actors and
aging rock stars.
The bedrock issues that adversely affect access to capital for small
businesses are layers below executive compensation. A brief review of the
bank regulatory oversight system is helpful to an understanding of the
current situation.
D. A Primer on Bank Regulation and Supervision
While the regulations and the oversight differ somewhat depending
upon whether an institution is primarily regulated by the U.S. Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Federal Reserve), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), or the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 44 at the federal level, and
for state-chartered banks, by various state administrators, the regulatory
scheme is by and large, while not uniform, substantially the same.
Particularly in times of economic distress as has been experienced over the
past four years, the importance of federal deposit insurance has militated in
favor of a greater role for the FDIC and more uniformity of oversight.
Bank supervision begins with routine bank examinations performed by
the federal bank regulatory agencies (OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC and
OTS) and state banking commissions. If an examination reflects problems,
the regulators monitor the institution more closely, limit its incentives to
take excessive risk, require more capital and more frequent reporting-and
ultimately, if the situation becomes dire, close the bank. Each bank has a
primary federal regulator: the OCC for national banks, savings banks and
federal branches of foreign banks; the Federal Reserve for members of the
Federal Reserve System; and the FDIC for state insured banks and state
branches of foreign banks.
Examinations of deposit institutions are conducted periodically, usually
on twelve to eighteen month cycles, and comprehensively cover all aspects
of activity, from consumer protection areas such as truth-in-lending and
community reinvestment regulations, to trust operations and the adequacy
of data process systems. The most significant review is the "safety and
44 OTS, as with many institutions it formerly supervised, has gone away. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) assumed
responsibility for the ongoing examination, supervision, and regulation of federal
savings associations on July 21, 2011. The OCC on July 20, 2011, issued a final
rule implementing several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, including changes to
facilitate the transfer of functions from the OTS. Section 312 of the Dodd-Frank
Act also transferred supervisory and rule-writing authority for SLHCs and their
non-depository subsidiaries from the OTS to the Federal Reserve Board on July 21,
2011. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act included provisions applicable to the FDIC with
respect to state savings associations. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5641 (2010).
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soundness" examination, usually conducted collaboratively or jointly
among the applicable regulators (e.g., for a state-chartered bank in Florida,
the FDIC and the Florida Office of Financial Regulation). The key areas of
review are capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and
liquidity. An exit interview is conducted by the examiners and generally
several months later, a Report of Examination is delivered to the bank.
Ratings (CAMELS ratings) on each of the five key areas of review, and
overall, are assigned within a range of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. A
composite CAMELS rating of 1 means that the bank is performing well
above average, and a composite 2 means the bank is performing adequately.
A 3 rating brings the institution into the realm of more-than-normal
supervision because it indicates below average performance. It is at this
point that the special scrutiny begins. If a bank is assigned a CAMELS 4
rating, this means that there are serious problems, and a CAMELS 5 rating
generally means that the bank likely will not recover and will be closed.
When examinations reveal weaknesses in one or more areas, the
regulators will require the bank's board of directors to adopt "resolutions"
to acknowledge the problems, assume responsibility and take corrective
action. This special oversight is generally accomplished in a non-public
manner and allows the bank time to correct its deficiencies or improve its
practices. Another common informal action when a bank receives a
CAMELS 3 rating is a "memorandum of understanding" (MOU) that
contains specific remedial measures and timeframes within which
improvements are required. MOUs are not published, which is beneficial to
the bank from a customer and competitor perspective. Historically, these
written agreements accounted for somewhat more than one-half of all
supervisory corrective actions. If a capital deficiency was the bank's
primary or sole problem, a capital directive in the form of written
agreement sometimes was used to remedy the situation. An "individual
minimum capital ratio notice" (IMCR), which does not require the consent
of the bank, is another form of capital directive.
Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides the FDIC with
a broad range of formal administrative enforcement powers. 45 When a bank
is rated a CAMELS 4 or 5, this is generally considered severe enough to
warrant formal action under Section 8, usually in the form of a "cease and
desist" order--directing the bank to cease and desist from engaging further
in specified unsafe and unsound practices at the risk of serious sanctions for
failure to do so. 46 Cease and desist orders become publicly available upon
45 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2006).
46 The regulators sometimes move swiftly through the various stages of special
oversight and may skip a level of supervision. The author represents a national
bank with an overall CAMELS rating of 3 which recently was placed under a
formal agreement (the OCC's version of a consent order), even though the bank
was not, prior to that event, under any special oversight. Efforts to impose a
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entry and are published by posting on the agency's website or news release.
These orders are generally viewed as an extremely negative sign in the
marketplace by customers and investors. The trading price of a publicly-
traded bank is adversely affected and larger customers with deposits in
excess of federal insurance limits often are concerned. While
representatives of regulatory agencies dispute these market and competitive
effects on banks, the agencies have tacitly admitted that this is indeed the
case through a change in nomenclature. The words "cease and desist" have
been eliminated, and the administrative documents imposing these
sanctions are now captioned "Consent Orders" and generally referred to
simply as "Orders."
The negative marketplace reaction to the Consent Order directly affects
one of the primary "unsafe and unsound" practices that the bank is directed
to correct-operating with an inadequate level of capital protection for its
assets. In other words, the bank is directed to improve its capital position by
raising more money while the adverse publicity caused by the Order chills
the market and makes it increasingly difficult for the bank to do so. Finding
new investors is nearly impossible because the Order requires the
bank-should new capital not be available--to provide the regulators
within a matter of weeks with a contingency plan, which would include a
plan to sell or merge the bank or voluntarily dissolve it. With the possibility
of closure hovering so near, even existing shareholders are reluctant to
invest further for fear of "throwing good money after bad."
In addition to raising more money, there is an alternative to improving
the bank's level of capital protection for its assets-reducing the level of
the assets. However, this alternative points out another primary "unsafe and
unsound" banking practice-inadequate earnings. The typical Order directs
the bank to increase earnings to augment capital and support reserves.
Obviously, with a reduced level of income-earning assets, it is more
difficult to increase earnings. If the bank is having difficulty raising capital
or improving earnings, and it is restricted in growing its new loan portfolio,
then it will similarly have difficulty correcting a third primary "unsafe and
unsound" banking practice-placing an excessive concentration of loans in
commercial real estate and construction. With the depressed economy of
the past four years, particularly in Sunbelt states, there has been essentially
no new residential or commercial real estate construction. But pre-2007,
these types of loans represented a substantial part of new loans, and
therefore constitute a substantial part of existing portfolios.
For good measure, this situation results in yet a fourth primary "unsafe
and unsound" banking practice--operating with an excessive level of
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) rather than the formal agreement were
unsuccessful.
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adversely classified, loans and assets.47 The array of corrective actions
required in the Order comes full circle because the bank is directed to
remain "well capitalized." This, unfortunately, proves to be an elusive
concept. As discussed below, a bank today must have and maintain a 10%
total risk-based capital ratio to be well-capitalized under bank regulatory
capital guidelines, but the current level of total risk-based capital required
by many Orders is 13% or 14%. The most common measure of community
bank capital adequacy is the Leverage Ratio, which under bank regulatory
capital guidelines must be at least 5% in order for an institution to be
considered "well capitalized." Under most Orders that ratio is raised to 8%
or 9%.
E. Regulatory Impediments to Lending
1. Bank Capital Requirements
It is axiomatic that a bank must have funds in order to make loans.
These funds come from customer deposits and capital, which may be
borrowed funds or equity. How much capital a bank must have, and how
capital is measured, are not simple issues. The first formal bank capital
adequacy standards were pronounced in 1981 in a joint policy statement
issued by the OCC and the Federal Reserve.48 Beyond the published
guidelines, the specific level of required capital was intended to be handled
on a case-by-case basis. As a direct result of an adverse appellate court
ruling that set aside a portion of an OCC cease and desist order on the basis
that the agency had no specific statutory or regulatory authority to impose a
7% capital requirement, legislation confirmed the federal policy that the
bank regulators indeed have the authority to cause banking institutions to
achieve and maintain adequate capital.49 Capital, thus, has become the Holy
Grail for bank regulators.
The purpose behind capital requirements is to assure that a bank has
adequate capital to reflect the risks incurred by the bank in making loans.
How risk is measured is a subjective, complex matter, of course, and how
the value of the assets constituting capital is measured is similarly
complex. 50 Capital is further segmented into categories (e.g. Tier 1 capital,
47 A typical Consent Order addresses the issue of too many classified loans by
requiring the bank to eliminate some of those assets immediately. For example, in a
March 2011 Order entered into by a bank holding company and its state-chartered
subsidiary bank with the Federal Reserve, the bank was required to eliminate from
its books "by charge-off or collection" all assets or portions of assets classified
"loss" in the bank's last examination.
48 Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 248 (Dec. 28, 1981).
49 First Nat'l. Bank v. Comptroller, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983).
50 Capital is not the same as equity on a balance sheet, and not all dollars are equal
from a regulatory perspective. "Tier 1 capital" is the primary determinant of a
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Tier 2 capital, Total Risk-Based Capital) and the capital actually required
by the regulatory agencies has routinely become greater than the level
established by the guidelines. For example, Tier 1 capital of 5% no longer
means that a bank is "well-capitalized" by the regulators if a bank has a
CAMELS rating below a 2. This is true even though some analysts believe
that inadequate capital is not a verifiable major cause of bank failure.5' Tier
1 capital of 8% or higher is required for banks under MOUs. Given the
subjectivity that pervades the capital area, perhaps the only statement that
can be made with certainty is that 2% is a hard floor-below which a bank
will be closed.52
Different amounts of capital are required with respect to different kinds
of loans. For example, concentrations of subprime loans will require banks
to hold capital that is one and one-half to three times the normal
requirement. Capital requirements for income-producing real estate loans
are much higher than for owner-occupied real estate loans. While there is a
sound basis for this policy, in practice its application can become difficult.
Contrast, for example, an office complex owned and operated by a
commercial developer and managed by a leasing firm with a small office
building owned by a lawyer, whose firm occupies a portion of the building,
with the remainder leased to three other small firms. Even though the risk
profiles of these two credits may be significantly different, the capital
requirements are the same-or, at least, are often interpreted to be the same
by the bank examiners.53 Even within the residential lending category, the
bank's financial strength. Consisting of the institution's common stock and retained
earnings, it also includes certain non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred stock.
"Tier 2 capital" consists of preferred stock with fixed maturities and long-term debt
with maturities longer than five years. While each regulatory agency has the ability
to impose its own supervisory requirements, U.S. bank regulators generally act
under inter-agency common standards, and these are coordinated internationally
through the "Basel I" and "Basel II" accords established through negotiations of
representatives of the central banks of the most developed nations to promote the
stability of the international banking system. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).51 Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory
Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299,
1350 (1989).
52 As an indication of current desirable capital ratios, it was reported that no banks
receiving Small Business Lending Fund funding had a Tier 1 leverage ratio of less
than 7% and only two had a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of less than 10%, with
average March 31, 2011, Tier 1 leverage and risk-based capital ratios of 10% and
13.3%, respectively. See Barry Hester, A Statistical Look at SBLF Recipients to
Date, BRYAN CAvE LLP BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.bankbryancave.com/
2011/08/a-statistical-look-at-sblf-recipients-to-date/. See infra part VI.A for a
discussion of the Small Business Lending Fund and related programs.
13 Based upon an examination of a state-chartered non-Federal Reserve member
bank client of the author. The attorney owner of the multi-unit real estate property
had substantial net worth, and because his law offices were adjacent to the leased
space, had the opportunity to closely monitor his tenant and to promptly find a
replacement tenant if that became necessary, or to utilize the space himself. He had
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rules are complicated and there are disparities. For example, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac will not purchase "no cash outlay refinance" loans, even
though the Veterans Administration and the Federal Housing Authority
permit such loans. This means that homeowners cannot as easily refinance
their loans to take advantage of lower rates and assist their cash flow. Many
banks believe a refinancing would make the borrower stronger, thereby
providing more protection, since the borrower's guarantee is already in
place, and no new funds are being advanced.
2. "Troubled Banks"
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
provided enhanced enforcement authority to the FDIC and directed
regulators to take "prompt regulatory action" when bank quality
decreases.54 As explained above, when a bank becomes undercapitalized by
reference to the capital adequacy guidelines or in the view of the
supervisory agencies, the regulators will take prompt action to remedy the
situation. This generally involves development of a capital plan by the bank
to obtain more capital and restricting the bank's business to reduce risk.
The effect on the bank's customers is immediate, especially for small banks
and small businesses. Once a community bank comes under stricter
regulatory scrutiny, it has significantly less discretion in assisting its
customers. During the recent economic recession, this often resulted in the
bank's inability to work with a stressed customer, even when the
customer's loans were not in default.55
3. Inability to Raise Capital
The difficulty faced by smaller banks in raising capital during the
2008-2011 period cannot be overstated. As the economy worsened and
asset values, particularly real estate asset values, plummeted, the difficulty
in finding investors willing to take on new risk dramatically increased.
every incentive to remain current in his loan because, upon default, he would have
to move his own offices, with the attendant business disruption and expense.
Nevertheless, the examiner viewed the property in the same manner as if it were
owned by an absentee landlord with no interest in the property other than as an
investment.54 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.
55 As an example, the following language was included in a Consent Order entered
into by a state-chartered bank with the FDIC: "[D]uring the life of this Order, the
Bank shall not extend, directly or indirectly, any additional credit to, or for the
benefit of, any borrower who has a loan or other extension of credit from the Bank
that has been classified, in whole or part, 'Substandard."' In re Riverbank Spokane,
Washington, FDIC- 11-385b, 9 (Aug. 29, 2011), available at http://fdic.gov/bank/
individual/enforcement/2011-08-1 0.pdf.
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Valuation of troubled loans became nearly impossible as unemployment
spiked and consumer spending decreased. While seeking funds in these
circumstances has been challenging for any business company, the situation
has been exponentially worse for a banking institution because of the
56stohoincreasingly harsh regulation by the bank agencies . To the question how
much capital is enough, there has been no clear answer. If a bank was well-
capitalized under the regulations (5%), and even under a customary MOU
condition (e.g., 8%), the possibility that an Order would increase the
required capital level to, for example, 11% has chilled investment.
An even larger impediment to raising capital has been, in the author's
view, the manner in which the regulators have responded to the capital
plight of the regulated institutions.5 7 Although the FDIC has the authority to
infuse funds into a depository institution to avoid losses, this remedy has
been rarely used.58 Typically, when a bank is on the verge of collapse, the
FDIC supervises a "purchase and assumption" transaction whereby a
healthy bank or investor group assumes the failing bank's assets, deposits
and other liabilities.5 9 The FDIC enters into a risk-sharing relationship with
56 In December 2009, a bank client of the author raised nearly $10.5 million in
capital. In August 2011, one of the premier national financial institution investment
bankers, on behalf of the same client, contacted over fifty potential investors or
merger partners, including local, regional and international financial institutions,
private equity firms and blind pools. Only ten firms indicated initial interest, fewer
than six executed non-disclosure agreements and received confidential information
on the bank, and only one expressed serious interest in a merger transaction. The
bank's predicament was similar to many others in the author's recent experience.57 The lack of a realistic understanding of the capital markets by the regulators has,
in itself, been a deterrent to capital-raising. For example, during the early stages of
the financial crisis, private investor groups were forming to provide capital for the
acquisition of troubled banks. In one such transaction, a financial firm with
experienced bank executives on board to manage the target bank, organized a fund
and entered into a letter of intent with an FDIC-insured state bank holding
company represented by the author. The regulators insisted on early disclosure of
the participants in the fund, failing to understand that investors would not commit
to funding until after due diligence and the negotiation of a definitive agreement.
Regulatory concern for investors "acting in concert" and which ones might own,
directly or indirectly, 10% of the institution after closing effectively inhibited the
process from gaining traction. The letter of intent expired, and no transaction was
consummated. In this case, the new fund would have invested more than
$100 million in the bank, then operating under an MOU, and its current
shareholders would have received a fair price for their stock.
58 The Dodd-Frank Act has limited the ability of the FDIC to infuse capital into
banks except where there is a systemic risk exemption. In other words, this tool is
available only for banks deemed "too-big-to-fail." 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(a) (2010).
59 There are alternative ways in which the FDIC can proceed with a failed bank,
including paying off insured deposits under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (f), marketing the
*institution under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(c), or a structured asset sale. In July 2010, a
securitization pilot program was established for single-family mortgages whereby
the FDIC retained a 15% interest in a $400 million guaranteed pool. See generally
Roadmap to Financial and Housing Market Stabilization Plans, TEXAS LAND
TITLE Assoc. (Oct. 17, 2010), available at http://www.tlta.con/documents/
hottopics/docs/RoadmapUpdate.pdf. The most common transaction, however, is
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the successor bank to provide it with an incentive to also take over the
troubled assets of the closed institution. Under these arrangements, the
FDIC will share, often as much as 50%, in the losses incurred by the
successor bank on the assumed assets. These arrangements save the FDIC
money at the time of a bank closing because the agency does not have to
pay the successor institution as much money up front to honor the failed
bank's deposits. If the failed bank's assets eventually are worth more than a
party was willing to bid for the assets, the FDIC will have made a favorable
investment. Of course, if the assets are worth less in the future than the
discounted value agreed upon, the FDIC will be responsible for its
percentage of the assets.6°
This "incentive" to the successor banks has, in fact, acted as a
significant deterrent to private sector investors to invest in struggling banks.
Investors, including other financial institutions, are reluctant to take the risk
of investing in a troubled bank, thereby exposing themselves to 100% of the
eventual loss on bad loans when they could wait until the bank fails and
take as little as 50% of the risk. In fact, the risk in most of the failed bank
cases is actually zero given the mathematics of the discount on the assets
covered by the loss-share and the deposit premium. Most purchasers have
booked immediate gains of millions of dollars on the day of closing because
they cannot lose money unless they fail to administratively handle the
portfolio properly according to the loan purchase agreement and loss-share
agreement with the FDIC.
Based on the foregoing realities-particularly for a community bank
with a limited geographic footprint-and little upside for the investor,
capital-raising has come to a standstill. In the past, current shareholders
would likely have bought additional stock in private offerings to shore up
their community bank, avoid dilution and protect their investment.
However, during the past several years, even current investors are
increasingly reluctant to risk new funds. The availability of FDIC-assisted
transactions has stifled traditional acquisition activity as buyers seek loss-
61
sharing agreements to protect against future credit deterioration.
This result is not surprising. Whether the more benign MOU or the
more draconian Consent Order is the supervisory tool employed, a bank is
the purchase and assumption transition, generally with a loss-share agreement,
described in the article. The FDIC has entered into loss share agreements with
successor institutions covering more than $180 billion.
60 Potential Mixed Messages, supra note 27.
6 As an indication of the frequency with which this approach is employed in the
Southeast, where most of the failures have occurred (53% of the total during the
first nine months of 2011), there were thirty-eight FDIC-assisted transactions, only
six (15.8%) of which did not have loss-share arrangements. Quarterly Southeast
M&A Report, THE HOVDE GRP. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.thehovdegroup.com/
resources/publications (follow "Nationwide M&A report - Q3 2011 " hyperlink).
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under severe restrictions. Smaller banks are forbidden to grow until they
work their way out of their problems. While they can still make loans, they
generally are not allowed to grow assets in a quarter more than their
earnings.62 For many banks, particularly in the previously high-growth
Sunbelt states, the poor economy and real estate values, if not the culprits,
are certainly the roadblocks that impede recovery. These are the twin devils
for banks, not bad management, incompetence or fraud. In the current
economic environment of stagnant growth, low inflation and practically no
new customers, the bank's troubled assets lose value with each new
appraisal. A downward spiral inevitably results. Restrictions on growth and
flexibility make it more difficult for the bank to work out of its current
situation. The dilemma is that these same factors that led to the need for
more capital make it nearly impossible to raise that capital. Even beyond
the capital requirements and limitations on new loan growth, the amount of
periodic reporting and administrative oversight required of troubled banks
is unnecessarily burdensome, requiring the bank to increase its personnel
and incur greater third party appraiser and legal costs in order to comply
with its increased supervision.6 3 The pressure on bank management, already
thin to begin with in a community bank, and the negative impact on
employee morale, leads to an untenable position for these smaller
institutions.
62 As an example, the following language was included in a 2011 Consent Order
entered into by a state-chartered bank with the FDIC:
While this Order is in effect, the Bank shall notify the
Supervisory Authorities at least 60 days prior to undertaking
asset growth that exceeds 10 percent or more per annum or
initiating material changes in asset or liability composition. In no
event shall asset growth result in noncompliance with the capital
maintenance provisions of this Order unless the Bank receives
prior written approval from the Supervisory Authorities.
Citizens Bank & Trust Company Eastman, Georgia, FDIC-1 1-150b (May 13,
2011), available at http://fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/2011-05-02.pdf.
The effect of this restriction is that the bank must raise more capital to grow,.
63 As an example, a 2010 Cease and Desist Order entered into with the OTS
required a federally-chartered bank to, among other things, develop and submit to
the regulator a capital plan, a business plan, revised policies, procedures and
methodologies relating to allowances for loan and lease losses, a plan to reduce
problem assets (including individual workout plans), a formal risk management
plan, revised liquidity and funds management policies and procedures, a revised
fair lending program and a revised consumer compliance program-and to provide
quarterly or more frequent reports to the OTS with respect to each of these new or
revised directives. Harrington Bank, FSB, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, OTS
Docket No. 17910, SE-10-056 (Nov. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/enforcement/9753 1.pdf.
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IV. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS UNDER FIRE
A. The Regulatory Landscape
The FDIC has the authority to impose enforcement remedies beyond
the regulatory limitations discussed above, including the assessment of civil
monetary penalties, removal of directors, officers or controlling
shareholders and initiation of proceedings to terminate deposit insurance. It
has been more than a decade since being a bank director was a plum to
embellish a resume, but the risks of serving as a bank director today are
real. Following good corporate process, keeping complete and accurate
minutes and making decisions free from conflicts of interest and on the
basis of sound credit underwriting are now, more than ever, essential.
Diligence, close monitoring of management, using independent loan
evaluators and ensuring legal compliance, all are crucial. Nevertheless,
even a strong governance process and adherence to traditional banking
practices may not be enough. If the bank is closed, the regulators will be
scrutinizing the activities of the bank's board of directors and its executive
officers. Since the number of bad loans, after all, has increased, additional
reserves beyond those envisioned have been needed, which have eliminated
earnings and sapped capital, and since the regulators have determined that
the bank requires stricter supervision and is no longer operating in a safe
and sound manner, it is extremely difficult for a director to assert that he or
she has done an adequate job. A typical Order contains findings by the
regulator that the bank already has violated banking regulations. 64 If the
bank ultimately is closed, the FDIC now almost routinely sends letters to
directors of the failed institution, seeking information and raising the
specter of imposition of personal liability for the bank's losses.65 Anecdotal
information suggests that claim letters may be expected in 30% to 40% of
all failed bank cases resulting from the financial meltdown.
Entry of a Supervisory Order requires the determination of an
administrative law judge after a hearing and findings of specific facts.
However, the full administrative review process rarely occurs. Before filing
64 For example, earlier in 2011, to address bank holding company directors'
concerns that the subsidiary bank was making admissions that were in dispute, the
author attempted to revise the following provision in a proposed Order that would
require the financial institution "to cease and desist from any action ... for or
toward causing, bring about, participating in, counseling, or the aiding and abetting
of the unsafe or unsound banking practices that resulted in" a list of enumerated
laws and regulations (emphasis added). The negotiations with the federal regulator
to substitute the words that may result in for the words resulted in were
unsuccessful.
65 Craig McCrohan & Aaron Stanton, FDIC Seeking to Recoup Bank Losses From
Bank Directors, Bus. L. TODAY (Mar. 17, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/blt/content/2011/02/article-mccrohon-stanton.shtml.
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an administrative complaint against a bank to impose greater restrictions
and supervision on the institution, the regulators provide the bank the
opportunity to enter into a "stipulation to the entry of a Consent Order."
Prior to entry of the order, each of the members of the board of directors is
required to sign the stipulation.66 These stipulations include standard
language that the consent to issuance of the order is made "solely for the
purpose of this proceeding and without admitting or denying any of the
alleged charges of unsafe or unsound banking practices and any violations
of law and/or regulations," and thus are not legally admissions by those
who sign it that the bank already has violated banking regulations. This,
however, may be small solace at a future date. In fact, by entering into the
stipulation, the bank expressly has waived receipt of a written notice or
complaint, all defenses to the charges that would be set forth in that
complaint and a hearing before an administrative law judge for the purpose
of taking evidence regarding those allegations. Further, the bank waives the
right to file exceptions and briefs with respect to the recommended decision
or order of the administrative law judge if the bank disagrees with his or her
findings.
At the same time that the bank is presented with a proposed Consent
Order, its directors are provided individual notice of the proceeding,
reminded of their responsibilities as directors and advised to consult with
their counsel about their obligations and responsibilities.67 For the typical
community bank director, receipt of such a letter is a. sobering and
unsettling experience, and for. some directors it is downright frightening.
These letters underscore that the director can be held liable for losses
caused by the actions taken--or lack of actions taken-by the board of
directors. The letters may explicitly state that the FDIC has sued directors
for failure to properly supervise the affairs of the bank.
Even given the heightened awareness of their own personal liability, the
bank directors, often after much anguish and discussion with bank counsel
and their own attorneys, almost inevitably agree to the stipulation and entry
of the Order. The alternative-a formal administrative proceeding,
tremendous legal expense and management distraction-is not tenable. As a
practical matter, without negotiating leverage with the regulatory agency,
adequate financial resources or resolve to engage in a protracted and
66 While signatures of only a majority of the members of the Board of Directors are
required, the regulators are generally insistent that all directors sign the Order, even
if they were not present at the board meeting where agency officials and attorneys
Presented the Order and proposed stipulation.
A director of an FDIC-insured, state-chartered bank received a letter
contemporaneously with the delivery to the bank of a proposed Consent Order,
which contained the language described in the article, and included an admonition
that failure to take corrective action in a prompt and prudent manner could result in
civil money penalties or more severe enforcement actions being recommended to
the FDIC Board of Directors.
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expensive administrative proceeding, entry into the stipulation and Order is
the only viable choice.
B. Directors and Officers at Risk
As a bank moves through the supervisory stages-routine inspections,
reports of examination, resolutions, Memorandum of Understanding and
Consent Order-its officers and directors understandably become more
concerned about the risk of potential exposure to personal liability. Two
high profile lawsuits, against officers of IndyMac in July 2010 and directors
and officers of Heritage Community Bank in November 2010, raised the
68awareness of the risks of serving on bank boards of directors. As of
September 13, 2011, the FDIC had authorized the filing of lawsuits against
294 individuals affiliated with 32 failed institutions, asserting damage
claims of at least $7.2 billion. This includes 14 filed lawsuits (one of which
has settled) naming 103 former directors and officers. 69 The FDIC also has
authorized 20 fidelity bond, attorney malpractice and appraiser malpractice
lawsuits in addition to the 175 residential malpractice and mortgage fraud
lawsuits currently pending, and cooperates with the Department of Justice
in criminal investigations into the activities of former bank employees,
including officers and directors.7 °
Directors and officers, as well as controlling shareholders, are included
within the definition of "institution-affiliated parties" who may have
personal responsibility and liability for their reckless actions or knowing
conduct that caused significant losses to the bank or had a significant
adverse impact on the bank.7' The most common situation in which liability
68 Complaint, F.D.I.C. v. Van Dellen, No. 2:10-cv-04915-DSF (C.D. Cal. July 2,
2010); F.D.I.C. v. Saphir, No. 10 C 7009, 2011 WL 3876918 (N.D. I11. Sept. 1,
2011). In the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, the FDIC is believed to have
instituted claims against directors and officers of nearly one-quarter of the failed
institutions. To date, there have not been a significant number of civil actions filed
against former bank directors and officers as a result of bank failures during the
Fast four years.
9 See Professional Liability Lawsuits, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
70 Id. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006), sets forth an
expansive list of persons for whom liability may exist.7' The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
established gross negligence as a national minimum standard of liability. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(k).
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be
held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action
by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of [the FDIC] ...
acting as conservator or receiver ... for gross negligence,
including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a
greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence)
including intentional tortuous conduct, as such terms are defined
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is explored is in the context of a bank failure and litigation by the FDIC as
72
receiver in a civil action for monetary damages.
Following a bank's failure, its former directors and executive officers
may receive a letter from the FDIC with a demand for payment of civil
money damages. While not generally made public, these demand letters
typically allege breach of fiduciary duties to the institution and that the
individual acted in a negligent or grossly negligent manner in conducting
the business of the bank. 3 The classified or foreclosed loans generally form
the basis of damages and the purpose of the demand letter is to constitute a
"claim" under the bank's directors and officers' liability insurance policy.
Subpoenas may be served to seek documents and testimony from the
directors and officers.74 These discovery requests generally extend beyond a
review of the bank's classified assets to include whether the former director
or officer has the resources to satisfy a judgment and whether there have
been recent asset transfers to put the individuals' assets beyond the reach of
creditors. This is done because the FDIC has a duty to attempt to achieve
the maximum recovery possible and, in determining whether to initiate a
lawsuit, the agency evaluates the likelihood of success and the cost-benefit
of pursuing particular defendants.75
The FDIC is also authorized to pursue claims under a lesser standard if
permissible under state law, but most state laws impose liability on bank
officers and directors only for gross negligence. These fiduciaries are
and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation
under other applicable law.
Id.
72 12 U.S.C. § 1818(k) authorizes civil actions by the FDIC as receiver for acts
alleged to constitute gross negligence. The bank regulators have used the authority
set forth in Section 1818(c) to justify asset freezes against institution-affiliated
persons during the pendency of an administrative proceeding. See United States. v.
Thomas Spiegel, 995 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1993); Lenz v. F.D.I.C., 251 F. Supp. 2d
121 (D.D.C. 2003); F.D.I.C. v. Lenz, 323 F. Supp. 2d 342, 344 (D. Conn. 2004). 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A) provides for restitution or indemnification; Section
1818(i)(2) provides for civil money penalties against institution-affiliated parties
from $5000 per day up to a maximum of $1 million.
73 See In re Bank United Fin. Corp., 442 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
74 Lawsuits are often not filed for two or more years after a bank failure. Former
directors and officers will have difficulty responding to claims regarding the losses
with respect to identified individual loans because access to bank documents is
restricted.
75 Claims are pursued based on a two-part test: Theclaim must be (i) sound on its
merits and the receiver must be more than likely to succeed in any litigation
necessary to collect on the claim and (ii) cost-effective, considering liability
insurance coverage and personal assets held by the defendant. FDIC, MANAGING
THE CRisis: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 266 (1998).
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protected under the business judgment rule.76 The FDIC acknowledges this
standard and will not bring claims against officers and directors "who fulfill
their responsibilities, including the duties of loyalty and care, and who
make reasonable business judgments on a fully informed basis and after
proper deliberation., 77 There is a three-year statute of limitations but the
FDIC generally moves rapidly with its demand letter, which is sent through
its outside counsel.
The FDIC's Rules of Procedure require the agency to consider
mitigating factors, such as the financial resources of the individual, his or
her good faith conduct, if any, the gravity of the underlying conduct and
alleged violations and any previous enforcement actions or violations.78
Where board minutes or other records reflect that the director or officer
acted affirmatively to correct unsound practices or ensure regulatory
compliance, this documentation would serve to help protect him or her from
liability.
Claims from shareholders and the bankruptcy trustee of the holding
company for a closed bank represent additional risks to bank officers and
directors.79 While the allegations usually relate to securities fraud claims for
failure to adequately disclose the extent of the bank's true financial
condition, claims also are routinely made against directors for breach of
their fiduciary duties, gross mismanagement and corporate waste. A jury
rendered a verdict in late 2010 against the officers and directors of
BankAtlantic Bancorp of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for misrepresenting the
value and risk of the bank's real estate loan portfolio.80 There also have
been actions filed under ERISA. For example, the directors and members of
certain committees responsible for oversight of Colonial Bancgroup's
profit-sharing plan were sued in early 2010.81 In this litigation, the
76 Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of Bank Directors and Officers, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Dec. 3, 1992), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/
5000-3300.html#fdic5000statementct.77 ANTON R. VALUKAS, EXAMINER'S REPORT, IN RE LEHMAN BROS. HOLDINGS INC.
16, 22, available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%201.pdf. The
examiner in that case concluded that, while management made "a series of business
decisions [that] had left it with heavy concentrations of illiquid assets with
deteriorating values," they amount to only "poor judgment" and were within the
protection of the business judgment rule. Id.
Statement Concerning the Responsibilities of Bank Directors and Officers, supra
note 76.
79 The standing of third parties is limited because the FDIC, as receiver, succeeds to
"all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution and of
any stockholder, member, accountholder, depositor, officer or director of such
institution with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution." 12 U.S.C.
182 l(d)(2)(A) (2006).
In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 25, 2011).
81 Amended Complaint, In re Colonial Bancgroup, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-792-MHT-
WC (M.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2010) (No. 99).
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plaintiffs' alleged failure to investigate the improper business practices of
Colonial Bank, the principal operating subsidiary of the company and
further that, as the bank's condition worsened, these defendants knew or
should have know that the -holding company stock was an unduly risky
investment option for the company's 401(k) retirement plan.82
C. Legal Claims and Insurance
The ability to recover against bank directors and officers liability
insurance policies, as noted above, is a driver for the FDIC in its evaluation
of whether to initiate civil litigation against institution-affiliated persons.
The risk of loss has led to a tightening of available coverage and increased
premiums for directors of troubled institutions. If insurance is available, the
"regulatory exclusion" in the policies may make the benefits of insurance
illusory. When a bank fails, an FDIC attorney routinely reviews and
evaluates possible claims against the failed bank's directors. Whether the
agency sues an individual director may depend on whether there is
insurance and whether a judgment against the director would be collectible.
Proving a claim may not be the impediment a director would expect
because the nature of the potential claims are often broad and generic, for
example, failure to adhere to policies or proper documentation of
exceptions to policies. The risk of liability and a legitimate concern that
insurance is inadequate could deprive smaller banks of the independent
judgment and business experience of its outside directors at precisely the
time the institution most needs those individuals for advice and guidance in
difficult decision-making.83
D. Officers Under the Microscope
Officers of a financial institution are in an even less enviable position
than directors if the regulators believe they were "responsible" for the
problems of a closed institution. In an effort to recover part of the losses to
the Deposit Insurance Fund from 2008 through mid-2011 of more than
$75 billion, the FDIC is reportedly actively pursuing more than fifty bank
executives. "These investigations are now beginning to produce results, and
we anticipate that many more will be authorized," said FDIC Chair Sheila
82 Id.
83 "Despite the fact that they had nothing to do with the financial crisis, community
banks are already having great difficulty in attracting and retaining qualified
directors given the perceived hostile regulatory environment and the prospect of
FDIC litigation and personal liability for directors of failed banks." Memorandum
from Christopher Cole, Senior Vice President and Senior Regulatory Counsel,
Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to the 29th Annual SEC Gov't-Bus. Forum on Small
Bus. Cap. Formation (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/201Ogbforum/201Ogbforum-icba.pdf.
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C. Bair in a statement on October 8, 2011.84 In the FDIC lawsuit against
IndyMac Bancorp, recovery of over $300 million in damages is sought
from four executives.8 5
Under the category of adding insult to injury, officers who are
terminated without cause can fall within the FDIC's "golden parachute"
policy and be denied their contractual rights to severance under
employment agreements, even an agreement entered into long before the
bank experienced capital or other difficulties.86 If an institution is
"troubled" (defined by the FDIC as banks with a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5
or that meet other defined criteria), it cannot make a "golden parachute"
payment without approval. Unless the officer was not "substantially
responsible" for the insolvency or troubled condition of the bank, such
regulatory approval will not be forthcoming.87 Therefore, to be paid
severance under a pre-existing employment agreement, even one that was
entered into years before the bank was "troubled," the former officer must
demonstrate that he or she was not "substantially responsible" for the
insolvency or troubled condition of the bank. It is unlikely, in such
circumstances, that the bank would stipulate that one of its former key
executive officers was not substantially responsible, alone or with others,
for the current condition of the bank. Therefore, the likelihood that the
former key executive would prevail in. his or her claim is extremely low.
A bank officer is also subject to risk of repayment of past
compensation. On July 6, 2011, the FDIC adopted a final rule to implement
the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank
Act, including how compensation will be recouped fiom senior executives
and directors who are "substantially responsible" for the failure of a
depository institution.88 Under the new rule, the FDIC as receiver will
84 Peter Whoriskey, FDIC to Sue Bank Officials in Effort to Recoup $1 Billion in
Losses, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 2010, at A16. Chairman Bair also said,
"As a matter of policy, the FDIC believes strongly in accountability for directors
and officers who personal misconduct led to a bank's failure." Id.
85 The FDIC's acting general counsel Richard Osterman was quoted as saying
recently that "[w]hen these banks fail, people don't come in and say, 'We did
something wrong, here's the money' .... We're continuing to review cases. We're
still fairly early in this crisis." Id.86 12 C.F.R. §§ 359.0-359.7 (2011).
87 12 C.F.R. § 359.4(4)(ii). Under Section 359.4(4), the officer further cannot have
(a) committed any fraudulent act or omission, breach of trust or fiduciary duty or
insider abuse with regard to the depository institution or its holding company that
has had or is likely to have a material adverse effect on either entity; (b) materially
violated any applicable federal or state banking law or regulation that has had or is
likely to have a material effect on either entity; or (c) violated or conspired to
violate specified other statutes. Id.
88 Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41626-0
(July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380). The rule became effective on
August 15, 2011.
126 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:1
BUSINESS LAWJOURNAL
consider whether the senior executive performed his or her responsibilities
with the degree of skill and care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances, and whether the
individual caused a loss that materially contributed to the failure of the
financial company. The final rule clarified that the standard of care that
would trigger the recovery of previously-paid compensation is negligence
and that gross negligence is not required.
From the viewpoint of the bank officer or director, the most chilling
aspect of the proposed rule is that the individual has the burden of proof to
establish that he or she exercised his or her business judgment. State
business judgment rules and insulating statutes will not shift the burden of
proof to the FDIC. 89 Even more frightening is that the FDIC rule contains in
"certain limited circumstances" a presumption that the senior executive
officer or director was substantially responsible and, therefore, subject to a
claw-back of up to two years of compensation. 90 As the FDIC explained:
Substantial responsibility shall be presumed when the
senior executive or director is the chairman of the board of
directors, chief executive officer, president, chief financial
officer, or acts in any other similar role regardless of his or
her title if in this role he or she had responsibility for the
strategic, policymaking, or company-wide operational
decisions of the covered financial company. The FDIC as
receiver also will presume the substantial responsibility of
a senior executive or director who has been adjudged by a
court or tribunal to have breached his or her duty of loyalty
to the covered financial company. Finally, in order to
ensure consistency this presumption also extends to a
senior executive or director who has been removed from
his or her position with a covered financial company under
section 206(4) or section 206(5) of the Act.9'
While an exception is created for senior executives and directors
recently hired by the financial company specifically for improving its
89 76 Fed. Reg. 136, 41629 (July 15, 2011).90 76 Fed. Reg. 136, 41631 (July 15, 2011). The compensation recoupment period
is unlimited in the case of fraud.
91 Id. While a number of commentators on the proposed rule objected to the use of
the rebuttable presumption in these circumstances, the FDIC perfunctorily stated
that "the use of rebuttable presumptions for those individuals under the limited
circumstances described in the Proposed Rule is aligned with the intent shown in
the statutory language; thus, the presumptions remain unchanged in the Final
Rule". Id.
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condition, this is of no assistance to the existing officers and directors who
now have the burden to prove their innocence.92
V. THE IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON SMALL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The expansive scope and reach of the Dodd-Frank Act is acknowledged
but, given its comprehensive reach, not well understood. At roughly 2300
pages, the Act requires 243 rulemakings, 67 one-time reports or studies and
22 new periodic reports. While the SEC bears the brunt of the new
requirements (with 95 mandated new rulemakings, 17 studies and 5 new
periodic reports), the Federal Reserve and the FDIC have, combined, been
directed to promulgate 54 new rulemakings. 93 These three agencies and the
other regulators required to undertake these studies, reports and
rulemakings will be under the watchful eye of the General Accounting
Office, which itself is directed by the Dodd-Frank Act to make twenty-five
reports and studies.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the numerous and far-
reaching effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on small business. 94 Therefore, with
the purpose of merely selecting a handful of issues that are non-obvious to
the general reader, the author hopes to provide a small insight into the
disproportionate burdens placed on smaller entities by comprehensive
92 12 C.F.R. 380.7(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2011). This Section applies to senior officers or
directors who were hired or joined the board within the two years prior to the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver. Id.
Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman, remarked publicly that the agency needed to
add 800 employees to carry out the mandates of the Dodd-Frank Act. ABIGAIL
ARMS ET. AL., HOT ISSUES IN SECURITIES LAW 2010: DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS
AND TRENDS, PRACTISING LAW INST. (2010).
94 SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, 2010 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON
SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION FINAL REPORT 116 (2011). For example,
Section 413 of the Dodd-Frank Act modifies the "accredited investor" net worth
test standard for individual investors, effective immediately upon enactment to
$1 million, excluding the value of the investor's primary residence. Letter from
Richard B. Chess, President Real Estate Investment Securities Association,
William H. Winn, Legislative/Regulatory Chair REISA, & Deborah S. Froling,
Legislative/Regulatory Task Force REISA, to Gerald J. Laporte, Chief Office of
Small Business Policy, Division of Corporation Policy (Nov. 12, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus.shtml. Although the dollar threshold for the net
worth test was not increased, by excluding the value of an investor's primary
residence, the Act effectively tightened the eligibility standards for individuals to
meet the test for accredited investors. Id. On January 25, 2011, the SEC issued
proposed rules, adding the statutory language, noting that, while 9.04% of U.S.
households qualified for accredited investor status on the basis of the net worth
standard before it was modified by Section 413(a), only 6.55% would have
qualified on the modified standard-a difference and elimination of 2,891,938
investors. Id. The impact on smaller companies seeking private financing is
immense. Id. The Real Estate Investment Securities Association estimated that this
provision would exclude potentially one out of every two investors in the
Regulation D private offering market. Id.
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legislation directed primarily at larger institutions. The burdens and costs
may not have been intended by Congress or the regulatory agencies that
must implement the new legislation, but the impact is immediate and real.
Therefore, for purposes of illustration only, the following Dodd-Frank
issues are identified for brief mention as to their effect on smaller financial
institutions.
A. The Durbin Amendment
Under the Dodd-Frank Act and the proposed debit interchange
implementing rule, community banks are not effectively carved out by the
statutory exemption for debit cards issued by institutions with less than
$10 billion assets. This would, according to the Independent Community
Bankers of America (ICBA) "fundamentally alter the economics of
consumer banking. '' 95 This would occur because under proposed regulations
and the merchant card system under discussion, granting retailers the ability
to route debit card transactions over the network of their choice, where the
card issuer currently designates the network on which the card is routed,
will allow retailers to bypass the two-tier system. Large retailers, according
to the ICBA, will be able to incentivize customers to use the rate-controlled
cards issued by the largest banks, discriminating against community banks
and their customers.
B. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) mandated by
the Dodd-Frank Act is focused on the largest institutions, yet it will have
extremely broad powers. A year after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
agency was still in formation and its authority and operation still under
political attack.96 While the federal bank regulators over the years have
developed expertise in balancing the safety and soundness of banking
operations with consumer protection against unfair and harmful practices,
their influence over the new CFPB regulations through the Financial
Stability Oversight Council is circumscribed. The Council has veto power,
but it can be exercised only by a finding, demonstrated by a two-thirds vote,
that the regulation "puts at risk safety and soundness of the banking system
or the stability of the financial system"-an incredibly high standard. The
CFPB rules likely will add to the costs community banks already spend on
consumer protection.
95 The Effect of Dodd-Frank of Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Serv. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm.
of Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 116, 118 (2011) (statement of James D. MacPhee,
Chairman, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am.).
96 President Obama did not nominate Richard Cordray to be the CFPB's first
Director until July 2011 and, as of October 2011, Mr. Cordray still had not been
confirmed by the Senate.
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C. Risk Retention
Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires mortgage originators to
retain credit risk on non-qualified residential mortgages-but the definition
may be implemented too narrowly, according to the Independent
Community Bankers of America. 97 In testimony before Congress, the ICBA
cautioned that credit could be severely limited to many borrowers if the
rules are overly restrictive and, community banks will be disadvantaged
because of their lack of access to the increased capital needed to offset risk
retention requirements. Furthermore, the association warned that
community banks in rural communities would be driven out of the market
by Farm Credit System direct lenders that have an exemption for loans that
they make, insure, guarantee or purchase.
D. Escrows for Taxes and Insurance
While escrowing funds for taxes and insurance is generally a sound
practice, it can be particularly costly for small lenders. This is because
many of them with small lending volumes outsource their escrow services
and do not qualify for volume discounts. These additional costs may
encourage many community banks to reduce or eliminate their mortgage
businesses. Particularly for loans collateralized by rural properties, which
do not lend themselves to securitization, some commentators believe that
mandating escrows in all circumstances is unnecessary.
98
VI. BRIGHT SPOTS FOR SMALLER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Small Business Lending Fund
In his State of the Union address in January 2010, President Obama
proposed the idea of providing additional capital to community banks to
spur lending for community banks to broad acclaim from both political
parties. On September 27, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Small
97 The Effect of Dodd-Frank of Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Serv. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm.
/fFin. Servs., supra note 95.
98 Id. There are various other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that
disproportionately affect smaller banks. In his testimony, James D. MacPhee cited
the provisions requiring the regulatory agencies to replace all references to "credit
ratings" with an "appropriate standard for measuring creditworthiness." Certainly,
the credit rating agencies did not meet the expectations of independence, diligence
and sound analysis that were expected of them. Nevertheless, since community
banks lack the resources to independently analyze credit quality, the Independent
Community Bankers of America suggests that they be entitled to use credit ratings
with appropriate regulatory authority to confirm those ratings in situations where
additional credit analysis is warranted.
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Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Jobs Act).99 By the end of the year, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury released a term sheet and application for the
new $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) established by the
Jobs Act to encourage lending to small businesses by providing Tier 1
capital to qualified community banks with assets of less than $10 billion. i0 0
As stated by the Treasury in its release, through the SBLF "Main Street
banks and small business can work together to help create jobs and promote
economic growth in local communities across the nation."'' 1
Through this initiative, the Treasury was expected to provide banks
with capital by purchasing Tier 1 qualifying preferred stock or equivalents
in each bank.1°2 The dividend rate on SBLF funding is reduced as a
participating community bank increases its lending to small businesses. The
initial dividend rate to the Treasury is, at most, 5%. If the bank's small
business lending increases by 10% or more, then the rate falls to as low as
1%. The program criteria are quite flexible, and businesses with up to
$50 million in annual revenues were eligible to apply for loans of up to
$10 million for commercial and industrial purposes, nonresidential real
estate loans, loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to
farmers. The program requires the funds to be made available through
insured depository institutions with assets of less than $10 billion. Banks
that have total assets of $1 billion or less could apply for SBLF funding of
up to 5% of risk-weighted assets. Banks with assets of more than $1 billion,
but less than $10 billion, could apply for SBLF funding that equals up to
3% of risk-weighted assets. Institutions that were on the FDIC's problem
bank list, or similar list, or had been removed from such lists within the
previous ninety days were ineligible for SBLF funding. Generally, this
disqualified banks with a composite CAMELS rating of 4 or 5. This
program offered great promise for providing badly needed financing for
small businesses. The reality was quite different from the expectation.
99 Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
1636) (2011).
o See Small Business Lending Fund, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/Small-Business-
Lending-Fund.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
1o1 Id.
102 Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Small Bank-Holding Company Policy Statement:
Treatment of Subordinated Securities Issued to the United States Treasury Under
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the Small Business Jobs
Act of 2010, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (2012). For Sub-S or mutual bank holding
companies, the SBLF funds qualify as Tier 2 capital. However, for these types of
institutions, pursuant to an interim final rule published on June 13, 2011, by the
Federal Reserve, small bank holding companies (those with less than $500 million
in consolidated assets) can downstream the funds as Tier 1 capital into their
subsidiary banks. Robert Klingler, Fed Confirms Tier 2 Treatmentfor Sub S SBLF
Funds, BRYAN CAvE LLP BLOG (June 13, 2011), http://bankbryancave.com/
2011/06/fed-confirms-tier-2-treatment-for-sub-s-sblf-funds-2/.
2012 Regulators' Responsibility for Small Banks' 131
Inability to Finance Customers
In the Wake of the Financial Meltdown
According to Timothy Massad, Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial
Stability, in testimony before Congress on February 28, 2011, the Treasury
was close to announcing its first round of investments in community banks.
This was received with great relief because, as with much of the federal
stimulus money in 2009, there was widespread disappointment that the
actual stimulus dollars were not rapidly deployed. Unfortunately, the SBLF
experienced the same bureaucratic delays as the earlier stimulus funds.
On March 30, 2011, the day before the application deadline for banks
taxed as C corporations to apply for the SBLF, the deadline was extended to
May 16, 2011, and as of that date, the approximately 600 banks that had
already applied were still awaiting meaningful feedback from the Treasury.
On May 26, 2011, after the -application deadline, the Treasury placed
further restrictions on the eligibility of participants, providing that only
institutions without any dividend restrictions could participate in the SBLF.
In going beyond the eligibility standards imposed by the enabling statue,
the Treasury limited the number of eligible institutions and effectively
eliminated de novo institutions from the program.
Finally, on July 7, 2011, the Treasury announced that four holding
companies in Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan and Washington and two
community banks in Texas and Virginia had received the first $123 million
in SBLF funds, ranging from $3 million to $48.3 million. Seventeen more
banks and holding companies received $214 million in SBLF funding on
July 20, 2011. While "better late than never," it is beyond understanding
why a highly heralded program focused on small business took nearly ten
months to get off the ground. While a great number of jobs could have been
created with $30 billion, it took ten months to deploy $123 million, and the
promise of new jobs proved greater than the end result.
For myriad reasons, including the complexity of the legal
documentation required, banks' concerns over increasing regulatory
supervision and intrusion, and real or perceived questions over eligibility,
fewer than 1000 of the nation's 7000 community banks applied for SBLF
funding. The aggregate amount of requested funds was slightly less than
$12 billion, one-third of the federal funds available. Yet, of the requested
funds, only $692 million had been approved. In other words, a $30 billion
cornerstone federal program to help small businesses, delivered less than $1
billion (only 6% of the funds applied for) to the marketplace. The program
expired on September 27, 2011, and, by any objective measure, cannot be
deemed a success.
10 3
103 While the Department of the Treasury has commented that many of the bank
applications were not worthy of funding, the author is familiar with at least one
application in which a healthy community bank, notwithstanding support from its
primary federal regulator, was denied SBLF funding without explanation.
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B. Other Small Business Credit Initiatives and Tax Incentive Programs
The State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI), a key part of the
Small Business Jobs Act, allocates $1.5 billion to new and existing state
programs that will leverage private financing to spur $15 billion in new
lending to small businesses and small manufacturers. A total of fifty-four
states and territories applied to take part in the SSBCI, and sixteen states
had had their applications approved for $570 million in SSBCI funding by
June 20, 2011. On August 16, 2011, the Department of the Treasury
announced the approval of SSBCI applications for funding from eleven
states and Washington, D.C. With a total of $360 million in SSBCI funds,
the Treasury expects these states and Washington, D.C. to generate a
minimum of at least $10 in new private lending for every $1 in federal
funding, or more than $3.6 billion in new private lending.104 The deadline
for applications under the SSBCI was September 27, 2011, and it appears
that the full $1.5 billion provided by the Jobs Act of 2010 was not allocated.
The Obama Administration by its admission has supported seventeen
direct tax breaks that provide tax relief of more than $50 billion for small
businesses. These programs were designed to support job creation and
retention, entrepreneurship, investment and growth. The Administration has
also reported that it has worked with Congress to extend and expand Small
Business Administration loan programs that helped put more than
$42 billion in loans to small businesses. Whether these efforts served to
spur job creation or improve the economy is subject to debate. The U.S.
economy did expand at an annual rate of 1.3% in the April-June quarter of
2011 but, even so, the economy grew at an annual rate of only 0.9% for the
first half of the year, the weakest six-month performance since the end of
the recession in June 2009.
C. Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-Basel II
A substantial contributing factor to the capital difficulties experienced
by the larger "too-big-to-fail" banks was that they were able to determine
their own minimum capital requirements subject to regulatory agency
review rather than a standard established by the banking agencies that
applied to all sizes of institution. The bifurcated risk-based capital
framework embodied in the advanced risk-based capital adequacy standards
(advanced approaches rules) implemented on a transition basis in December
2007 (ironically, December 7) established a series of transitional floors and
limits that allowed larger banks to operate with lower minimum risk-based
capital requirements. Section 171(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the
104 Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury
Announces Funds to Spur $3.6 Billion in New Lending to Small Businesses, Help
Create Jobs (Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg 1278.aspx.
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bank regulatory agencies to establish minimum risk-based capital
requirements for all insured depository institutions, depository institution
holding companies supervised by the Federal Reserve and non-bank
financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve at not less than the
"generally applicable" capital requirements in effect for insured depository
institutions as of the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act (4% Tier 1
and 8% total risk-based). This would level the playing field according to the
Independent Community Bankers Association.
105
VII. BANK FINANCING FOR SMALL BUSINESSES IN THE FUTURE
Since community banks provide the lion's share of financing for
America's small businesses, the health of community banks is critical to our
national recovery. Unfortunately, smaller banks are severely ailing. For
example, in Florida, for many years the leader in new bank organization,
247 banking institutions lost a combined $1.505.billion in 2010. That
followed combined losses for Florida banks of $2.224 billion in 2009 and
$2.766 billion in 2008.06 On a national scale, those numbers pale as U.S.
financial losses from the credit crisis have been predicted to rise as high as
$3.6 trillion. 107 From a high of 14,000 institutions, the number of U.S.
banks had declined to 7574 by August 2011 and that number could drop to
around 5000 over the next two years. There were 157 bank failures in 2010
and already 64 through August 12, 2011, with another nearly 900
institutions on the FDIC Problem Bank list.
The overall banking industry is improving as indicated by recent profits
at the nation's largest banks. Pre-tax profits for the industry were more than
$125 billion in 2010 and $84 billion through the second quarter of 2011.,08
105 Letter from Christopher Cole, Senior Vice President and Senior Regulatory
Counsel, Indep. Cmty. Bank. of Am., to the Off. of Comptroller of the Currency,
Bd. of Govemors Fed. Reserve Sys. and Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Feb. 28, 2011),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal!2010/10c 11Dec3O.PDF.
106 At June 30, 2011, while Florida banks with assets less than $100 million were
still in a loss position, all insured institutions in the state as a group generated YTD
net income of $76 million. FDIC State Banking Performance Summary, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp (follow "State Banking
Performance Summary" hyperlink; then select "Florida" for "Geographical Area,"
"Jun. 30, 2011" for "Report Date"; then follow "All Insured Institutions"
hyperlink).
Patrick Kuo, Bond Risk Rises After State Street Reports Fixed-Income Losses,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =
conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=STT:US&sid=aLBzcfeBS9M. New York
University Professor Nouriel Roubini in early 2009 predicted that U.S. financial
losses from the credit crisis could reach $3.6 trillion. Since approximately one-half
of that amount was in the hands of banks and broker-dealers, that collectively only
had capital of $1.4 trillion, Professor Roubini said the U.S. banking system was
"effectively insolvent." Id.
108 Gandel, supra note 10, at 45.
134 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
The condition of the Deposit Insurance Fund has improved over the past
several quarters and, at June 30, 2011, achieved its first positive quarter-end
balance ($4.9 billion) since June 30, 2009.109 However, FDIC Chairman
Sheila Bair recently expressed concern that the banking recovery reflected
primarily the significant drop in loan-loss provisions, while bank lending
and operating revenue continued to drop. 10 Further, while loans to
commercial and industrial borrowers increased by $18.1 billion in the first
quarter of 2011, nearly half of the growth was in loans to foreign
borrowers. 1 '
Community banks may soon return to profitability according to Carson
Medlin, a leading small and middle-market investment banking firm. In a
recent report, the firm noted that most small banks have historically high
reserve levels (SIBR average of 2.38%) and have experienced abnormally
high charge-offs for nearly three years and, at some point, high provision
expenses will no longer be justified. While funding costs have also
declined, the report concluded, "we don't think future profitability will
resemble what was experienced in the past due to the rising cost of doing
business, primarily compliance related." ' 1 2 The Carson-Medlin report
continued that these factors will drive increased consolidation in the
industry. The view that the Dodd-Frank Act will lead to accelerated
consolidation was echoed in a recent Harvard Forum article attributing this
trend to more stringent capital requirements as well as more limitations on
business activities, increased compliance costs and emphasis on
"systemically important financial institutions," among other factors.'1 3
109 Quarterly Banking Profile, supra note 39, at 14.
110 Legal Update, PRACTICAL LAW CO. (May 24, 2011) (on file with author).
Chairman Bair's comments were underscored by her successor, Acting FDIC
Chairman Martin Gruenberg:
[R]eductions in loan-loss provisions-the money banks set aside
against expected loan losses-account for most of the
improvement in industry earnings. As the levels of loan-loss
provisions approach their historic norms, the prospects of
earnings improvement from further reductions diminish.
Increased lending will be essential for future revenue growth.
Martin J. Gruenberg, Remarks to the American Banker Regulatory Symposium
(Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/
spsep 191 l.html.
'11 Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2011, supra note 39.
CARSON MEDLIN, Southeastern Independent Bank Review Second Quarter
2011, (Sept. 10, 2011), available at http://www.monroesecurities.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Southeastem-Independent-Bank-Review-2nd-Quarter-
201 l.pdf.
113 Lee A. Meyerson, Reflections on Dodd-Frank. A Look Back and a Look
Forward, HARv. L. SC1H. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 10, 2011,
2:57 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov.
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VIII. EPILOGUE?
As happens repeatedly throughout our history, we end where we began.
Approaching retirement after more than eighteen years as the head of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Thomas Hoenig in August 2011
again criticized the regulatory focus on "systemically important financial
institutions," or SIFIs. Hoenig asserted these too-big-to-fail firms are
"fundamentally inconsistent with capitalism."'" 4 Hoenig cautioned that,
"[s]o long as the concept of a [sic] SIFI exists, and there are institutions so
powerful and considered so important that they require special support and
different rules, the future of capitalism is at risk and our market economy is
in peril."
Noting that until as late as 1980, the U.S. banking industry was
relatively unconcentrated, with 14,000 commercial banks and the assets of
the five largest institutions amounting to 29% of total banking organization
assets and only 14% of GDP, he decried the fact that currently the five
largest institutions control more than 50% of the industry's assets, which is
equal to almost 60% of GDP. He emphasized that this far more
concentrated sector has led to a less competitive banking system, with the
largest twenty banking institutions controlling 80% of the industry's
assets-or approximately 86% of GDP.
This result is disastrous for smaller businesses. While community banks
currently represent less than 11% of all bank assets, they support nearly
40% of bank loans under $1 million to small business and farms." 5 The
regulators recognize this. "Community banks, which comprise the vast
majority of FDIC-supervised banks, play a vital role in credit creation
across the country, especially for small businesses," FDIC Chair Sheila Bair
testified recently.'1 6 Yet, she also acknowledged that some bankers had
expressed concern that examinations were being conducted in an overly
conservative manner.
Over-regulation, the specter of liability for bank directors and
unwillingness to recognize the difficulties in raising capital and dealing
with classified assets must be addressed if smaller banks are to survive and
play their traditional role in small business growth and job creation. One
healthy and profitable community bank recently decided that the future for
small banks was so poor that it would simply get out of the bankitig
business. In August 2011, Main Street Bank of Kingwood, Texas decided to
voluntarily surrender its charter and sell its four branches to another bank.
"14 Thomas M. Hoenig, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of
Kansas City, Do SIFIs Have a Future?, PEW FIN. REFORM PROJECT & N.Y. UNIV.
STERN SCH. OF Bus. "DODD-FRANK ONE YEAR ON" (June 27, 2011).
115 Potential Mixed Messages, supra note 27.116 id.
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The 27-year-old institution, which lent most of its funds to small
businesses, cited a "tightening regulatory noose" for the decision to exit the
banking system. 17 According to the bank's chairman, nearly all of its
$175 million in loans, which average $100,000, were to local customers
with annual revenues of less than $1 million.
Main Street Bank is undoubtedly an outlier but the facts speak for
themselves. From 2002 to the second quarter of 2011, the number of
insured institutions with assets of less than $1 billion has declined from
8798 to 6846, while the number of institutions with assets greater than
$1 billion has increased from 450 to 561-and the number with assets
greater than $10 billion remained 106.118 This is true during a time period
when the number of bank assets grew from $8.4 trillion to $13.6 trillion.
The message should not be ignored.
There may, in fact, be some good news on the horizon. FDIC Acting
Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg, in' remarks to the American Banker
Regulatory Symposium in Washington, D.C. on September 19, 2011,
emphasized that, community banks play a "critical" and a "unique" role not
only in the financial system, but also in the U.S. economy as a whole. He
went on to note, however, "the financial crisis and ensuing recession have
taken a serious toll on community banks. Of the 395 FDIC-insured
institutions that have failed during the crisis, more than 300 have been
community banks."119
Acting Chairman Gruenberg stated that the FDIC would undertake a
number of initiatives to further its understanding of the challenges and
opportunities for community banks going forward by holding a conference
early in 2012 on the future of community banking and "reviewing key
challenges facing community banks such as raising capital, keeping up with
technology, attracting qualified personnel, and meeting regulatory
obligations." He concluded his remarks by stating that, "This overall effort
in regard to community banks will be a major priority for the FDIC over the
coming year.'
120
Hopefully, this will be the case so that smaller banks will again be able
to sustain their historic role of driving the economy by providing loans to
smaller businesses in local communities throughout the country. "[U]ntil
17 Robin Sidel, Fed Up: A Texas Bank Is Calling It Quits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2011, at C1.
118 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., www.fdic.gov.
119 See Gruenberg, supra note 110.
120 Acting Chairman Gruenberg further indicated that the FDIC was reviewing its
risk-management and compliance supervision practices to see if there were ways to
make the process more efficient. He stated that the FDIC would continue to have
direct outreach and an open dialogue with community bankers, hold a series of
regional roundtables with community bankers across the country to get their input
and continue its Advisory Committee on Community Banking.
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the bank regulatory agencies and Congressional leaders recognize that the
focus on 'too big to fail' institutions will only hasten the failure of smaller
banks and their small business customers, the recovery will remain anemic
and job creation sluggish.' 21
121 Luis A. Aguilar, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Comm'r Address at the Council of
Institutional Investors Spring Meeting (Apr. 4, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch040411 laa.htm). Commissioner Aguilar
described the recovery as "anemic" in his remarks. Id. The number of full-time jobs
in the banking sector alone, declined from 2,215,029 in 2007 to 2,104,698 at the
end of the second quarter of 2011 (a decrease of 5%). Id.
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